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Principal–agent problem / Asymmetric information / Market failure / Organizational theory


ISSN[removed]Dynamic Contracting with Limited Commitment and the Ratchet Effect Dino Gerardi
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Document Date: 2015-02-24 08:28:33


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City

Santos / /

Company

VF / /

Country

Soviet Union / /

Currency

USD / cent / /

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Holiday

Assumption / /

IndustryTerm

chemical combine / steel-processing plant / commitment solution / /

Organization

European Research Council / Method Department / Methods Department / /

Person

Paolo Ghirardato / Carlo Alberto / Dino Gerardi / Lucas Maestri / Luca Anderlini / Felipe Iachan / Daniel Gottlieb / /

Position

worker / ine¢ cient worker / productive worker / e¢ cient worker / unproductive worker / player / senior worker / politician / legislator / /

Product

Nikon D80 Digital Camera / /

URL

www.carloalberto.org/research/working-papers / /

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