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Bryan Caplan / Game theory / Rational ignorance / Rational choice theory / Government failure / Political economy / Rational expectations / Public choice theory / Economics / Economic theories
Date: 2009-04-28 19:11:18
Bryan Caplan
Game theory
Rational ignorance
Rational choice theory
Government failure
Political economy
Rational expectations
Public choice theory
Economics
Economic theories

Econ Journal Watch, Volume 2, Number 1, April 2005, ppFrom Friedman to Wittman: The Transformation of

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