Self-Confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique1 Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine2 First Version: January 14, 2007, This Version: August 6, 2007 Prepared for the Conference in Honor of Robert E. Lucas Jr. Abstract:

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Date: 2007-08-06 13:08:05 Self-confirming equilibrium Solution concept Nash equilibrium Rationalizability David K. Levine Trembling hand perfect equilibrium Subgame perfect equilibrium Macroeconomic model Information set Game theory Problem solving Economics		Self-Confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique1 Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine2 First Version: January 14, 2007, This Version: August 6, 2007 Prepared for the Conference in Honor of Robert E. Lucas Jr. Abstract: Add to Reading List Source URL: www.dklevine.com Download Document from Source Website File Size: 162,17 KB Share Document on Facebook

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