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Preferences or Incentives: What Motivates Village Leaders to Refrain From Misappropriating Public Resources? Malte Lierl∗† This version: March 16, 2015 First version: January 31st, 2014 Abstract
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Document Date: 2015-03-31 08:47:35


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City

Dar es Salaam / Nairobi / /

Company

Misappropriating Public Resources / Tanzania Tanzania / /

Country

Indonesia / Uganda / Afghanistan / Brazil / Tanzania / Liberia / Ethiopia / /

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Facility

Wageningen University / Georgetown University / Yale University / New York University / /

IndustryTerm

food aid / public services / /

NaturalFeature

Kilimanjaro / /

Organization

Institution for Social and Policy Studies / Department of Political Science / New York University / World Bank / Prime Minister’s Office / Wageningen University / Center for International and Area Studies / Georgetown University / Yale University / Research on Poverty Alleviation / /

Person

Martinez-Bravo / Lucy Martin / Rob Blair / Thomas Leeper / Gregory Huber / Delia Baldassarri / Kassandra Birchler / Steven Rosenzweig / Thad Dunning / Peter van der Windt / Katherine Baldwin / James Habyarimana / /

PoliticalEvent

democratic elections / /

Position

author / externally appointed village executive officer / village secretary and a village accountant / elected village chairperson / farmer / Chairman and CEO / elected chairperson / village chairperson / chairperson / elected politician / incumbent chairperson / district election officer / village manager / /

ProvinceOrState

Hanang District / Mufindi District / /

URL

http /

SocialTag