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Science / Best response / Normal-form game / Nash equilibrium / Repeated game / Strategy / Reinforcement learning / Machine learning / Outcome / Game theory / Problem solving / Economics
Date: 2015-02-11 05:55:08
Science
Best response
Normal-form game
Nash equilibrium
Repeated game
Strategy
Reinforcement learning
Machine learning
Outcome
Game theory
Problem solving
Economics

Ann Math Artif Intell DOI[removed]s10472[removed]A unifying learning framework for building artificial game-playing agents Wenlin Chen · Yixin Chen · David K. Levine

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Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu

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