Reliabilism

Results: 58



#Item
31Jonathan Adler (CUNY) Contextualism, Fallibility, and the Value of Knowing Can changes in the importance of being right alter the standards for knowledge? My critical analysis focuses on contextualism. The ultimate targe

Jonathan Adler (CUNY) Contextualism, Fallibility, and the Value of Knowing Can changes in the importance of being right alter the standards for knowledge? My critical analysis focuses on contextualism. The ultimate targe

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Source URL: www.epistemologynetwork.com

Language: English - Date: 2014-01-05 10:03:34
32Luminous Enough for a Cognitive Home Richard Fumerton Philosophy without phenomenology is blind. And on my view, use of the phenomenological method is nothing other than reliance on that with which we are directly acquai

Luminous Enough for a Cognitive Home Richard Fumerton Philosophy without phenomenology is blind. And on my view, use of the phenomenological method is nothing other than reliance on that with which we are directly acquai

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Source URL: myweb.uiowa.edu

Language: English - Date: 2009-06-11 12:56:54
33Evidentialism and Truth One might well begin a discussion of epistemic justification by wondering why a philosopher should be particularly interested in the concept. And perhaps the most natural answer is that justificat

Evidentialism and Truth One might well begin a discussion of epistemic justification by wondering why a philosopher should be particularly interested in the concept. And perhaps the most natural answer is that justificat

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Source URL: myweb.uiowa.edu

Language: English - Date: 2009-06-11 12:09:32
34Achieving Epistemic Ascent Sosa’s epistemology has long been marked by a desire to avoid unnecessary polarization through compromise that incorporates the insights of opposing camps. In particular he has recently urged

Achieving Epistemic Ascent Sosa’s epistemology has long been marked by a desire to avoid unnecessary polarization through compromise that incorporates the insights of opposing camps. In particular he has recently urged

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Source URL: myweb.uiowa.edu

Language: English - Date: 2009-06-11 13:13:59
35Reliabilism and the Value Problem May 2010

Reliabilism and the Value Problem May 2010

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Source URL: www.uibk.ac.at

Language: English - Date: 2014-06-03 03:02:57
36A DEFENCE OF EPISTEMIC CONSEQUENTIALISM By Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij and Jeffrey Dunn1 Epistemic consequentialists maintain that the epistemically right (e.g. the justified) is to be understood in terms of conduciveness to

A DEFENCE OF EPISTEMIC CONSEQUENTIALISM By Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij and Jeffrey Dunn1 Epistemic consequentialists maintain that the epistemically right (e.g. the justified) is to be understood in terms of conduciveness to

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Source URL: academic.depauw.edu

Language: English - Date: 2014-05-02 15:25:06
37Leite Research 1 Research (Note: This research statement was written for an audience of non-philosophers as part of my tenure materials, fall[removed]Philosophers, please take loose formulations with a pinch of salt!)  The

Leite Research 1 Research (Note: This research statement was written for an audience of non-philosophers as part of my tenure materials, fall[removed]Philosophers, please take loose formulations with a pinch of salt!) The

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Source URL: www.indiana.edu

Language: English - Date: 2006-08-17 17:23:11
38Microsoft Word - EEN Abstracts V1.docx

Microsoft Word - EEN Abstracts V1.docx

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Source URL: www.epistemologynetwork.com

Language: English - Date: 2014-01-05 10:03:36
391  KNOWLEDGE In Sandkühler, Hans-Jörg (Hg.): Enzyklopädie Philosophie. Hamburg 1999

1 KNOWLEDGE In Sandkühler, Hans-Jörg (Hg.): Enzyklopädie Philosophie. Hamburg 1999

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Source URL: www.unige.ch

Language: English - Date: 2007-02-08 03:37:41
4011098_2010_9620_ArticleOA 1..13

11098_2010_9620_ArticleOA 1..13

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Source URL: www.uibk.ac.at

Language: English - Date: 2014-06-03 03:02:54