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 Date: 2013-10-07 12:24:11Auction theory Auctions Game theory Vickrey auction Mechanism design Auction Bidding Sponsored search auction Inverse trigonometric functions Revenue equivalence Linkage principle |
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CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #3: Myerson’s Lemma∗ Tim Roughgarden† September 30, 
![BNE and Auction Theory Homework 1. For two agents with values U [0, 1] and U [0, 2], respectively: (a) show that the first-price auction is not socially optimal in BNE. (b) give an auction with “pay your bid if you win](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/26edde5edc3f5ad99d2c4f69417dfd70.jpg "BNE and Auction Theory Homework 1. For two agents with values U [0, 1] and U [0, 2], respectively: (a) show that the first-price auction is not socially optimal in BNE. (b) give an auction with “pay your bid if you win")
