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![]() Date: 2016-01-25 09:13:39Mechanism design Game theory Auction theory Vickrey auction VickreyClarkeGroves auction VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism Single-parameter utility Sponsored search auction Revenue equivalence | Add to Reading List |
![]() | Equilibrium Efficiency and Price Complexity in Sponsored Search Auctions Moshe Babaioff∗ Tim Roughgarden†DocID: 1rs9f - View Document |
![]() | Vickrey Auction VCG Combinatorial AuctionsDocID: 1rn7C - View Document |
![]() | Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design: ∗ Recent Results and Future Directions † ‡DocID: 1rico - View Document |
![]() | 0 An Expressive Mechanism for Auctions on the Web ¨ PAUL DUTTING , London School of Economics and Political Science MONIKA HENZINGER, University of ViennaDocID: 1rg46 - View Document |
![]() | Economics and Computation ECONand CPSCProfessor Dirk Bergemann and Professor Joan Feigenbaum Combinatorial AuctionsDocID: 1rbFF - View Document |