Bundling As An Optimal Selling Mechanism For A Multiple-Good Monopolist Alejandro M. Manelli ∗ Department of Economics College of Business Arizona State University

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Date: 2007-04-30 16:12:39 Mechanism design Game theory Social choice theory Virtual valuation Integration by parts Prime-counting function Revenue equivalence		Bundling As An Optimal Selling Mechanism For A Multiple-Good Monopolist Alejandro M. Manelli ∗ Department of Economics College of Business Arizona State University Add to Reading List Source URL: terpconnect.umd.edu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 297,83 KB Share Document on Facebook

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