Is Efficiency Expensive? Tim Roughgarden ∗ †

First Page		Document Content
Date: 2007-05-10 18:02:29 Auction theory Mechanism design Auctions Game theory Sampling Vickrey auction Revenue equivalence Auction Sponsored search auction Virtual valuation English auction Uniform distribution		Is Efficiency Expensive? Tim Roughgarden ∗ † Add to Reading List Source URL: theory.stanford.edu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 133,90 KB Share Document on Facebook

	Journal of Economic Theory–282 Private information revelation in common-value auctions Vlad Maresa and Ronald M. Harstadb, a DocID: 1vs29 - View Document
	Auctions plus round 3 logo DocID: 1vpl0 - View Document
	BMP Auctions: Cost-effective Watershed Management DocID: 1voZn - View Document
	Nonparametric Tests for Common Values In First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions∗ Philip A. Haile† Han Hong‡ DocID: 1vn1C - View Document
	English Auctions with Resale: An Experimental Study Sotiris Georganas NovemberAbstract DocID: 1viEC - View Document