CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture - Revenue equivalence - Document - PDFSEARCH.IO

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Date: 2014-03-19 07:35:11 Game theory Mechanism design Auction theory Decision theory Gaming Auctions Revelation principle Revenue equivalence First-price sealed-bid auction Incentive compatibility Vickrey auction Nash equilibrium		CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #12: Bayesian Incentive-Compatibility ∗ Tim Roughgarden† Add to Reading List Source URL: theory.stanford.edu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 136,70 KB Share Document on Facebook

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	CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory: The Top 10 List∗ Tim Roughgarden† December 4, The Vickrey auction. Remember back when you first learned it and it seemed surprising DocID: 1sLsp - View Document
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