Robust Mechanisms for Risk-Averse Sellers Mukund Sundararajan Qiqi Yan∗ Google Inc.,

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Date: 2012-07-04 18:28:34 Mechanism design Game theory Auction theory Auctions Vickrey auction VickreyClarkeGroves auction Auction VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism Virtual valuation Expected utility hypothesis Expected value Revenue equivalence		Robust Mechanisms for Risk-Averse Sellers Mukund Sundararajan Qiqi Yan∗ Google Inc., Add to Reading List Source URL: www.qiqiyan.com.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com Download Document from Source Website File Size: 298,98 KB Share Document on Facebook

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