RAND Journal of Economics Vol. 39, No. 3, Autumn 2008 pp. 664–682 Delegation and incentives Helmut Bester∗

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Date: 2008-10-06 05:53:52 Economy Business Asymmetric information Agency law Business law Economic theories Organizational theory Principalagent problem Theory of the firm Principal Law of agency Labour economics		RAND Journal of Economics Vol. 39, No. 3, Autumn 2008 pp. 664–682 Delegation and incentives Helmut Bester∗ Add to Reading List Source URL: www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de Download Document from Source Website File Size: 715,90 KB Share Document on Facebook

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