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The Evolution of Strategic Sophistication* Nikolaus Robalino Arthur J. Robson December 2, 2014 Abstract. This paper investigates the evolutionary foundation for our ability to attribute preferences to others, an ability
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Document Date: 2015-04-13 11:35:05

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UBC / Canada Research / Rochester Institute of Technology / Rochester / the University of Chicago / Department of Economics / National Science Foundation / Guggenheim Foundation / Toulouse School of Economics / Becker-Friedman Institute / Max Planck Institute / University of Wisconsin / Madison / UCR / UCSB / Simon Fraser University / Stanford / /

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Cal Poly / Leanna Mitchell / Arthur J. Robson / Luis Rayo / Dean Foster / Nikolaus Robalino Arthur / Antonio Penta / Larry Samuelson / Andrew Newman / Phil Reny / Daniel Monte / Ricky Vohra / Bill Sandholm / Cheney / Matt Jackson / Sally-Ann / Erik Kimbrough / /

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artificial intelligence / pdf / /

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