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Business / Problem solving / Economics / Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction / Auction / Bid / First-price sealed-bid auction / Revelation principle / Mechanism design / Game theory / Auctioneering / Auction theory


Side-Communication Yields Efficiency of Ascending Auctions: The Two-Items Case ∗ Ron Lavi† Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management The Technion – Israel Institute of Technology [removed]
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Document Date: 2012-09-26 07:59:52


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Country

United States / Netherlands / /

Currency

USD / /

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Facility

Israel Institute / /

IndustryTerm

quasi-linear utilities / business to business / primal-dual algorithm / electricity markets / /

Organization

Ron Lavi† Faculty of Industrial Engineering / Federal Communications Commission / Israeli Science Foundation / Paper / Israel Institute of Technology / Technion / Cornell University / Bi-national Science Foundation / /

Person

Larry Ausubel / Susan Athey / Ilya Segal / Ron Lavi / /

Position

author / non-jumping player / hand player / mechanism designer / jumping player / specific situation player / pb player / phase player / straight-forward / active player / case player / active player / j / result player / player / The Setting An auctioneer / auctioneer / /

Technology

primal-dual algorithm / /

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