<--- Back to Details
First PageDocument Content
Routing algorithms / Network theory / Shortest path problem / Algorithm / Auction algorithm / Floyd–Warshall algorithm / Mathematics / Applied mathematics / Theoretical computer science
Routing algorithms
Network theory
Shortest path problem
Algorithm
Auction algorithm
Floyd–Warshall algorithm
Mathematics
Applied mathematics
Theoretical computer science

Add to Reading List

Source URL: adrian.idv.hk

Download Document from Source Website

File Size: 720,22 KB

Share Document on Facebook

Similar Documents

Index Associativity, 27, 45 A-Priori Algorithm, 224, 225, 231 Attribute, 33 Accessible page, 199 Auction, 305

DocID: 1u74v - View Document

Game theory / Mechanism design / Decision theory / Gaming / Auction theory / Mathematics / Auctions / Operations research / Incentive compatibility / Combinatorial auction / VickreyClarkeGroves auction / Algorithm

RANDOMIZATION AND COMPUTATION IN STRATEGIC SETTINGS A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER SCIENCE AND THE COMMITTEE ON GRADUATE STUDIES

DocID: 1qO3F - View Document

Game theory / Mathematics / Price of anarchy / Algorithm / Single-parameter utility / Randomized algorithm / Valuation / VickreyClarkeGroves auction / Smooth number

Algorithms against Anarchy: Understanding Non-Truthful Mechanisms ¨ PAUL DUTTING , London School of Economics ¨ Informatik THOMAS KESSELHEIM, Max-Planck-Institut fur

DocID: 1qLPk - View Document

Graph theory / Mathematics / Mechanism design / Game theory / Auctions / Hypergraph / Valuation / VickreyClarkeGroves auction / VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism / Approximation algorithm / Treewidth / Optimization problem

Combinatorial Auctions with Restricted Complements Ittai Abraham Microsoft Research, Silicon Valley Moshe Babaioff Microsoft Research, Silicon Valley

DocID: 1q5aF - View Document

Game theory / Decision theory / Mathematics / Sponsored search auction / Price of anarchy / Auction theory / Mechanism design / Welfare economics / Bayesian game / Greedy algorithm / Generalized second-price auction

X Do Externalities Degrade GSP’s Efficiency? Tim Roughgarden, Stanford ´ Tardos, Cornell Eva

DocID: 1q0df - View Document