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Mathematics / Computational complexity theory / Lloyd Shapley / Matching / Combinatorics / Game theory / Cooperative games / Stable marriage problem / CC / Shapley / Marriage problem
Date: 2016-07-22 17:04:29
Mathematics
Computational complexity theory
Lloyd Shapley
Matching
Combinatorics
Game theory
Cooperative games
Stable marriage problem
CC
Shapley
Marriage problem

Computational Social Choice UPS Toulouse, 2015 Matching In a variant of the fair allocation problem, we try to match each agent

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