A Novel Strategy for the 2005 Penn–Lehman Automated Trading Competition Rahul Savani and Ben Veal Department of Mathematics, London School of Economics Houghton St, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom email:

Source URL: www.cdam.lse.ac.uk

The Parallel Complexity of Coloring Games Guillaume Ducoffe To cite this version: Guillaume Ducoffe. The Parallel Complexity of Coloring Games. Martin Gairing and Rahul Savani. 9th International Symposium, SAGT 2016, Sep

Source URL: hal.archives-ouvertes.fr

Psychological Science http://pss.sagepub.com/ The Unanticipated Interpersonal and Societal Consequences of Choice : Victim Blaming and Reduced Support for the Public Good Krishna Savani, Nicole M. Stephens and Hazel Rose

Source URL: web.stanford.edu

SCOSTEP Distinguished Young Scientist Award 2014 – Dr. Neel Savani Dr. Neel Savani of the Naval Research Laboratory is the recipient of SCOSTEP’s Distinguished Young Scientist Award for 2014 in recognition of his inn

Source URL: scostep.apps01.yorku.ca

• Solar phenomena
• Astronomy
• Space plasmas
• Outer space
• Astrophysics
• Plasma physics
• Coronal mass ejection
• Space weather
• Space physics
• Solar wind
• Corona
• Geomagnetically induced current

Exponentially Many Steps for Finding a Nash Equilibrium in a Bimatrix Game Rahul Savani and Bernhard von Stengel Department of Mathematics, London School of Economics, Houghton St, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom rahul@m

Source URL: www.maths.lse.ac.uk

• Game theory
• LemkeHowson algorithm
• Nash equilibrium
• Bimatrix game
• Strategy

Hard-to-Solve Bimatrix Games Rahul Savani Bernhard von Stengel Department of Mathematics London School of Economics

Source URL: www.maths.lse.ac.uk

• Game theory
• Bimatrix game
• Nash equilibrium

Geometric Views of Linear Complementarity Algorithms and Their Complexity Rahul Savani Bernhard von Stengel Department of Mathematics

Source URL: www.maths.lse.ac.uk

• Game theory
• Symmetric matrix
• Best response

Unit Vector Games Rahul Savani∗ Bernhard von Stengel† arXiv:1501.02243v3 [cs.GT] 14 Feb 2016

Source URL: www.maths.lse.ac.uk

• Game theory
• Non-cooperative games
• LemkeHowson algorithm
• Bimatrix game
• Nash equilibrium
• Best response
• Zero-sum game
• Symmetric game
• Strategy
• Symmetric equilibrium
• Normal-form game
• Risk dominance

Exponentially Many Steps for Finding a Nash Equilibrium in a Bimatrix Game∗ Rahul Savani and Bernhard von Stengel Department of Mathematics, London School of Economics Houghton St, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom email

Source URL: www.cdam.lse.ac.uk

• Game theory
• LemkeHowson algorithm
• Bimatrix game
• Nash equilibrium
• Strategy
• Symmetric game
• Best response
• Zero-sum game
• Normal-form game
• Symmetric equilibrium
• Risk dominance
• Folk theorem

Econometrica, Vol. 74, No. 2 (March, 2006), 397–429 HARD-TO-SOLVE BIMATRIX GAMES BY RAHUL SAVANI AND BERNHARD VON STENGEL1 The Lemke–Howson algorithm is the classical method for finding one Nash equilibrium of a bim

Source URL: www.maths.lse.ac.uk

• Game theory
• LemkeHowson algorithm
• Bimatrix game
• Nash equilibrium
• Symmetric equilibrium
• Symmetric game
• Zero-sum game
• Strategy
• Polytope
• Risk dominance
• Abstract polytope