Exponentially Many Steps for Finding a Nash Equilibrium in a Bimatrix Game Rahul Savani and Bernhard von Stengel Department of Mathematics, London School of Economics, Houghton St, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom rahul@m

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Date: 2004-11-05 05:40:57 Game theory LemkeHowson algorithm Nash equilibrium Bimatrix game Strategy		Exponentially Many Steps for Finding a Nash Equilibrium in a Bimatrix Game Rahul Savani and Bernhard von Stengel Department of Mathematics, London School of Economics, Houghton St, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom rahul@m Add to Reading List Source URL: www.maths.lse.ac.uk Download Document from Source Website File Size: 115,84 KB Share Document on Facebook