Sequential Equilibria of Multi-Stage Games with In…nite Sets of Types and Actions Roger B. Myerson and Philip J. Reny Department of Economics University of Chicago - Sequential game - Document - PDFSEARCH.IO

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	Sequential Equilibria of Multi-Stage Games with In…nite Sets of Types and Actions Roger B. Myerson and Philip J. Reny Department of Economics University of Chicago Add to Reading List Document Date: 2015-05-01 18:07:16 Open Document File Size: 283,82 KB Share Result on Facebook Company N Kg / Wilson / / Facility Economics University of Chicago Abstract Abstract / / IndustryTerm appropriate correlation device / / Organization National Science Foundation / Philip J. Reny Department / Economics University of Chicago Abstract Abstract / / Person Asher Wolinsky / Roger B. Myerson / Philip J. Reny / Pierre-Andre Chiappori / / Position Each player / player / matching player / / SocialTag Mathematical analysis Probability theory Sequential equilibrium Nash equilibrium Borel set Metric space Sigma-algebra Measure Game theory Mathematics

Sequential Equilibria of Multi-Stage Games with In…nite Sets of Types and Actions Roger B. Myerson and Philip J. Reny Department of Economics University of ChicagoAdd to Reading List