Revenue Maximizing Mechanisms with Strategic Customers and Unknown Demand: Name-Your-Own-Price. Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu and Philipp Strack∗ May 16, 2015

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Date: 2015-09-08 20:46:28 Economy Business Professional studies Market structure Mechanism design Game theory Social choice theory Economic equilibrium Revenue management Monopoly Economics Demand		Revenue Maximizing Mechanisms with Strategic Customers and Unknown Demand: Name-Your-Own-Price. Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu and Philipp Strack∗ May 16, 2015 Add to Reading List Source URL: pluto.huji.ac.il Download Document from Source Website File Size: 362,28 KB Share Document on Facebook

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