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Science / Knowledge / Social dilemma / Behavioral economics / Inequity aversion / Nash equilibrium / Norm / Social preference / Repeated game / Game theory / Social psychology / Economics


No. 88 Irenaeus Wolff Learning and Peer Effects When best-replies are not in equilibrium:
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Document Date: 2014-01-08 10:23:26

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EUR / /

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Facility

University of Konstanz When / behaviour§ Irenaeus Wolff Thurgau Institute of Economics / Thurgau Institute of Economics / University of Konstanz Hauptstrasse / Research Paper Series Thurgau Institute of Economics / /

IndustryTerm

even accounting / calculator device / /

Organization

Thurgau Institute of Economics / behaviour§ Irenaeus Wolff Thurgau Institute of Economics / Department of Economics / University of Konstanz When / University of Konstanz Hauptstrasse / Research Paper Series Thurgau Institute of Economics / /

Person

Dijkstra / Wolff Learning / Urs Fischbacher / Nicklisch / Alexander K. Wagner / /

Position

driver / chosen player / perfectly conditionally cooperative player / theoretic model of sociologist Dijkstra / general research question / last-moving player / player / sociologist / /

Technology

ESA / /

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