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Game theory / Non-cooperative games / Evolutionary game theory / Nash equilibrium / Strategy / Solution concept / Evolutionarily stable strategy / Zero-sum game / Normal-form game / Folk theorem / Epsilon-equilibrium
Date: 2016-06-17 06:57:25
Game theory
Non-cooperative games
Evolutionary game theory
Nash equilibrium
Strategy
Solution concept
Evolutionarily stable strategy
Zero-sum game
Normal-form game
Folk theorem
Epsilon-equilibrium

Equilibria in Finite Games Thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements of the University of Liverpool for the degree of Doctor in Philosophy by Anshul Gupta

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Source URL: cgi.csc.liv.ac.uk

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