THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEBT BONDAGE1 Ulf von Lilienfeld-Toal2 and Dilip Mookherjee3 JuneAbstract Laws permitting bonded labor in a matching market for contracts subject to moral hazard are shown to have two co

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Date: 2009-06-28 23:02:08 Asymmetric information Game theory Economic theories Law and economics Bond Economics Contract theory General equilibrium theory Market Law of agency Sports agent Agent		THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEBT BONDAGE1 Ulf von Lilienfeld-Toal2 and Dilip Mookherjee3 JuneAbstract Laws permitting bonded labor in a matching market for contracts subject to moral hazard are shown to have two co Add to Reading List Source URL: people.bu.edu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 432,91 KB Share Document on Facebook

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