Chile / Russia / United States / Argentina / Yugoslavia / /
Event
Reorganization / /
Facility
Stanford University / Stable Financial Structures / /
IndustryTerm
bank failure / bank restructuring / agent bank / Present supervisory systems / bank restructuring programmes / financial systems / implicit bank deposit guarantee / financial infrastructure / bank restructuring exercise / explicit bank deposit schemes / bank supervisors / bad risk management / public bank recapitalisation / risk management / bank losses / overwhelmed bank capital / bad accounting standards / bank distress / wider networks / profitable banking system / trained bank management staff / bank / accepted accounting standards / telecommunications / excessive commercial real estate lending / non-bank financial sector / banking / good bank / bank shareholders / /
MarketIndex
OTC 3 The / /
Organization
International Monetary Fund / Working Party on Transparency and Accountability / National Bureau of Economic Research / Hong Kong Monetary Authority / US Comptroller of the Currency / World Bank / Stanford University / London School of Economics / Federal Reserve Board / Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation / Bank of England / /
Person
Daniela Klingebiel / Morris Turner / Gillian Garcia / Washington D.C. Goldstein / Liliana Rojas-Suarez / Mathew Saal / Philipp Hartmann / Ulrich Meredith / Steven R Weisbrod / Guy Meredith / Ignacio Mas / Philip Turner / Charles / Thomas Mas / David T Llewellyn / Andrew Sheng / Yoon Je Cho / Ronald Pill / Gerard Klingebiel / Huw Pill / /
The framework for financial supervision: macro and micro issues Andrew Sheng Introduction Nearly 20 months after the beginning of the Asian crisis, we are still