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Stephen J. Dubner / Freakonomics / Science in society / Steven Levitt
Date: 2012-10-03 18:40:41
Stephen J. Dubner
Freakonomics
Science in society
Steven Levitt

SuperFreakonomics Discussion Questions Thank you so much for ordering discussion questions from _www.BookClubClassics.com_. I hope these questions add to your club’s enjoyment of the work.

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