IBM / AES / Google / YouTube / Facebook / DHCP / Intel / /
Country
China / /
Event
FDA Phase / /
Facility
SSL library / OpenSSL library / /
IndustryTerm
Internet access / good interim solution / communications security / application-layer protocol / password authentication protocols / intrusion detection systems / web browser / software symmetric-key encryption / protocol solutions / above protocol / bank login / legacy applications / public key algorithms / Internet applications / monitor communications / Internet traffic / main modern operating systems / password authentication protocol / tcpcryptaware applications / web developers / encryption protocols / bank / cryptographic algorithms / legacy server / untuned web server / tcpcrypt-aware web browser / cryptographic hardware / trivial authentication protocol / web forms / ways applications / server applications / application-level authentication protocols / web server / tcpcrypt server / computing / non-standard algorithms / deployed solutions / legacy web server process / cryptographic solution / tcpcrypt protocol / web server process / /
OperatingSystem
MacOS / Linux / OpenBSD / FreeBSD / DoS / BSD / /
Organization
US Federal Reserve / Stanford / /
Person
Stanford Dan Boneh Stanford / Andrea Bittau Stanford Michael Hamburg / Stanford Michael Hamburg Stanford Mark Handley / David Mazi`eres Stanford / /
Position
server administrator / /
Product
TCP / OpenSSL / S1 / /
ProgrammingLanguage
JavaScript / /
ProvinceOrState
Nova Scotia / North Carolina / California / /
Technology
3.3 Protocol / LAN / software symmetric-key encryption / application-layer traffic encryption / SSL encryption / password authentication protocol / above protocol / public key algorithms / Linux / symmetric-key encryption / API / trivial authentication protocol / application-level authentication protocols / operating system / SSL / operating systems / previous weak protocol / encryption / 2.1 Key exchange protocol / cryptography / tcpcrypt protocol / ubiquitous transport-level encryption / public key / factor preventing ubiquitous network encryption / firewall / application-layer protocol / TCP-level encryption / encryption protocols / following protocol / HTTP / caching / This protocol / following trivial authentication protocol / password authentication protocols / ID-based protocol / web server / using SSL / /
The case for ubiquitous transport-level encryption Andrea Bittau Stanford Michael Hamburg Stanford