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Texas Law Review See Also Response Give ‘Em Enough Rope: Optimal Design of Executive Pay and Rent Extraction Simone M. Sepe*
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Document Date: 2012-11-17 14:11:20

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File Size: 222,85 KB

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Company

Manager-Specific Investments / Long-Term Focus 152 Texas Law Review / ABC / Lehman / J. CORP. / Public Corporation / Texas Law Review / Bear Stearns / /

Country

United States / /

Currency

pence / /

Event

Security Buyback / Reorganization / Bankruptcy / Layoffs / /

Facility

Management Entrenchment / University of Siena / University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law / /

Organization

UCLA / Toulouse School of Economics / YALE / University of Siena / Common Agency / University of Arizona / College of Law / Yale Law School / /

Person

Holger Spamann / Douglas G. Baird / Saura Masconale / DAVID MARTIMORT / Paul Rose / Clifford W. Smith / Jr. / Stewart C. Myers / Jerold B. Warner / Alma Cohen / Andrei Shleifer / William H. Meckling / Cari Tuna / Lucian Bebchuk / S. Guido Carli / David I. Walker / Michael C. Jensen / Alan Schwartz / Iman Anabtawi / Frederick Tung / Robert K. Rasmussen / Nicholas S. Majluf / Jesse M. Fried / Simone M. Sepe / Kevin J. Murphy / JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT / B. Douglas Bernheim / Joann S. Lublin / /

Position

Professor of Law / manager / manager relationship / manager incentives / CEO / Model / Professor / aligning manager / single manager / Executive / Risk vs. Executive / Banker / Executive Compensation / common-agency model for public corporations / Associate Professor / /

ProvinceOrState

Texas / Delaware / /

PublishedMedium

the Texas Law Review / /

URL

http /

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