![Mechanism design / Game theory / Decision theory / Gaming / Vickrey auction / VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism / Monotonicity / VickreyClarkeGroves auction / Valuation / Incentive compatibility / Rental harmony Mechanism design / Game theory / Decision theory / Gaming / Vickrey auction / VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism / Monotonicity / VickreyClarkeGroves auction / Valuation / Incentive compatibility / Rental harmony](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/9f5cbbd7742a88752ff8e1f2895c8005.jpg) Date: 2015-07-07 06:56:08Mechanism design Game theory Decision theory Gaming Vickrey auction VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism Monotonicity VickreyClarkeGroves auction Valuation Incentive compatibility Rental harmony | | 0 Auctions for Heterogeneous Items and Budget Limits ¨ PAUL DUTTING , Department of Mathematics, London School of Economics MONIKA HENZINGER, Faculty of Computer Science, University of ViennaAdd to Reading ListSource URL: paulduetting.comDownload Document from Source Website File Size: 287,69 KBShare Document on Facebook
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