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Auction theory / Auctions / Game theory / Decision theory / Gaming / VickreyClarkeGroves auction / Auction / Competitive equilibrium / Sponsored search auction / Generalized second-price auction
Date: 2015-06-25 03:05:02
Auction theory
Auctions
Game theory
Decision theory
Gaming
VickreyClarkeGroves auction
Auction
Competitive equilibrium
Sponsored search auction
Generalized second-price auction

0 An Expressive Mechanism for Auctions on the Web ¨ PAUL DUTTING , London School of Economics and Political Science MONIKA HENZINGER, University of Vienna

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