Equilibrium Efficiency and Price Complexity in Sponsored Search Auctions Moshe Babaioff∗ Tim Roughgarden†

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Date: 2010-05-25 00:22:55 Auction theory Game theory Auctions Mechanism design Mathematics Decision theory VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism VickreyClarkeGroves auction Sponsored search auction Valuation Auction Vickrey auction		Equilibrium Efficiency and Price Complexity in Sponsored Search Auctions Moshe Babaioff∗ Tim Roughgarden† Add to Reading List Source URL: theory.stanford.edu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 215,71 KB Share Document on Facebook

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