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Incentives in Development Lending: Technical cooperation Josepa Miquel-Florensa∗ Toulouse School of Economics (ARQADE) June 5, 2010
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Document Date: 2014-04-29 05:22:18

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Company

The World Bank / /

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IndustryTerm

bank / bank management / energy / /

Organization

School of Economics / IADB / World Bank / International Monetary Fund / Multilateral Banks Board / Board of Governors / /

Person

Martin Naranjo / Matias Mednik / Yuri Soarez / /

Position

principal-manager / Private / player / manager / /

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