The Power and Limits of Tournament Incentives Armin Falk1 , Ernst Fehr2 , David Huffman3 March 28th, 2008 Abstract - Tournament theory - Document - PDFSEARCH.IO

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	The Power and Limits of Tournament Incentives Armin Falk1 , Ernst Fehr2 , David Huffman3 March 28th, 2008 Abstract Add to Reading List Document Date: 2014-03-27 06:30:03 Open Document File Size: 466,24 KB Share Result on Facebook Currency USD / NLG / CHF / / / Facility Swarthmore College / University of Zurich / University of Bonn / / IndustryTerm incentive device / / Organization University of Zurich / CEPR / University of Bonn / Swarthmore College / / Position CEO / / SportsEvent NASCAR / / SocialTag Business Market failure Organizational theory Principal–agent problem Economics Tournament theory Principal Incentive Loss aversion Asymmetric information

The Power and Limits of Tournament Incentives Armin Falk1 , Ernst Fehr2 , David Huffman3 March 28th, 2008 AbstractAdd to Reading List