Santander / Amazon / Deutsche Bank / Dropbox / MITM / Twitter / Google / Facebook / Bank of America / Microsoft / Apple / /
Continent
Europe / /
Country
Germany / Switzerland / Hungary / Netherlands / Poland / Austria / United States / United Kingdom / China / Spain / / /
IndustryTerm
telephony stack / security-critical applications / large Internet service providers / control protocol / Internet service providers / generation algorithm / authentication protocol / time-based credential generation algorithms / authentication server / cellular networks / online service providers / visual transaction signing solution / online apps / visual transaction authentication solutions / desktop operating systems / mobile 2FA solutions / Internet connection / malicious web page / 2FA systems / remote server / Internet traffic / online banking / device / target device / web engine / Internet gateway / Internet providers / bank / generation algorithms / login verification systems / online banking deployments / host software / banking / mobile 2FA systems / web site5 / 2FA login verification systems / web server / malicious device / 2FA devices / This solution / mobile device / /
OperatingSystem
Windows 7 / Android / Cross-platform / /
Position
manager of Java / Windows Task Scheduler / security manager / engineer / manager daemon process / /
Product
CrontoSign / Google Twitter 1564 1561 15 / PC / /
ProgrammingLanguage
Java / php / /
ProvinceOrState
Georgia / /
Technology
authentication protocol / LAN / SMS / smartphone / Android / mobile device / operating systems / time-based credential generation algorithms / mobile devices / cellular telephone / Clientside OTP generation algorithms / LAN/WLAN / WLAN / Java / generation algorithm / Smartphones / OTP generation algorithms / HTTP / control protocol / GSM / web server / /
On the (In)Security of Mobile Two-Factor Authentication Alexandra Dmitrienko2 , Christopher Liebchen1 , Christian Rossow3 , and Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi1 1