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Single-winner electoral systems / Political philosophy / Voting / Politics / Elections / Electoral systems / Social choice theory / Psephology / Condorcet criterion / Borda count / Plurality voting / Condorcet paradox
Date: 2016-07-22 17:04:25
Single-winner electoral systems
Political philosophy
Voting
Politics
Elections
Electoral systems
Social choice theory
Psephology
Condorcet criterion
Borda count
Plurality voting
Condorcet paradox

Voting Theory AAAI-2010 Voting Procedures and their Properties

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