RAND Journal of Economics Vol. 39, No. 3, Autumn 2008 pp. 664–682 Delegation and incentives Helmut Bester∗

First Page		Document Content
Date: 2008-10-06 05:53:52 Economy Business Asymmetric information Agency law Business law Economic theories Organizational theory Principalagent problem Theory of the firm Principal Law of agency Labour economics		RAND Journal of Economics Vol. 39, No. 3, Autumn 2008 pp. 664–682 Delegation and incentives Helmut Bester∗ Add to Reading List Source URL: www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de Download Document from Source Website File Size: 715,90 KB Share Document on Facebook

	Equilibria for games with asymmetric information: from guesswork to systematic evaluation Achilleas Anastasopoulos EECS Department University of Michigan DocID: 1uK6a - View Document
	Dynamic decision problems with cooperative and strategic agents and asymmetric information by Deepanshu Vasal A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment DocID: 1uC1Q - View Document
	The Case for Nil Votes: Voter Behavior under Asymmetric Information in Compulsory and Voluntary Voting Systems∗ Attila Ambrus†, Ben Greiner‡, and Anne Sastro§ Abstract DocID: 1ueuJ - View Document
	Asymmetric Information in the DocID: 1tKPn - View Document
	Asymmetric Information and Market Failure: A Market Process Perspective1 Glenn Fox University of Guelph Email: The theory of market failure has dominated welfare economics for nearly a century. Bator’s DocID: 1tGGh - View Document