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Auction theory / Mechanism design / Auctions / Game theory / Sampling / Vickrey auction / Revenue equivalence / Auction / Sponsored search auction / Virtual valuation / English auction / Uniform distribution
Date: 2007-05-10 18:02:29
Auction theory
Mechanism design
Auctions
Game theory
Sampling
Vickrey auction
Revenue equivalence
Auction
Sponsored search auction
Virtual valuation
English auction
Uniform distribution

Is Efficiency Expensive? Tim Roughgarden ∗ †

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

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