American Economic Association / Department of Economics / National Science Foundation / University of Maryland / Princeton University / Universitat Pompeu Fabra / Econometric Society / Federal Communications Commission / /
Person
Preston McAfee / Ronald Harstad / Charles M. Kahn / LAWRENCE M. AUSUBEL / Peter Cramton / Kathleen Ausubel / Vincent P. Crawford / Robert J. Weber / Motty Perry / Jacques Cre´mer / Michael H. Rothkopf / Jesse A. Schwartz / William Vickrey / Kerry Back / John W. Mamer / Sushil Bikhchandani / Philip Reny / Vijay Krishna / Paul R. Milgrom / Ennio Stacchetti / R. Preston McAfee / John G. Riley / Philippe Jehiel / John McMillan / Joseph M. Ostroy / Philip J. Reny / Robert Wilson / Benny Moldovanu / Richard P. McLean / Gabrielle Demange / John H. Kagel / Vernon Smith / Jaime F. Zender / will grant / Theodore Groves / Eric Maskin / Ronald M. Harstad / Faruk Gul / Eric S. Maskin / Alexander S. Kelso / John Ledyard / /
Position
economist / player / advocate / author / symmetric model / auctioneer / /
An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects By LAWRENCE M. AUSUBEL* When bidders exhibit multi-unit demands, standard auction methods generally yield inefficient outcomes. This article proposes a new ascendin