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Price of anarchy / Science / Strategy / Economics / Risk dominance / Game theory / Problem solving / Nash equilibrium


Network Uncertainty in Selfish Routing Chryssis Georgiou, Theophanis Pavlides, Anna Philippou Department of Computer Science University of Cyprus CY[removed], Nicosia, Cyprus {chryssis, phanosp, annap}@cs.ucy.ac.cy
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Document Date: 2006-01-20 03:04:57


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Company

SIAM Journal / Non-Cooperative Networks / Large-Scale Information Systems / /

Country

United States / /

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Facility

Computer Science University of Cyprus CY / /

IndustryTerm

polynomial-time algorithms / above algorithm / /

Organization

Computer Science University of Cyprus CY / Anna Philippou Department / European Union / /

Person

Nash Equilibrium / Burkhard Monien / Marios Mavronicolas / Nash Equilibria (Conjecture) / Anna Philippou / /

Position

model / Model for Selfish Routing / player / /

ProvinceOrState

Nebraska / New Mexico / /

PublishedMedium

Games and Economic Behavior / Annals of Mathematics / Theoretical Computer Science / Theory of Computing / /

Technology

above algorithm / polynomial-time algorithms / /

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