Relative Pay for Non-Relative Performance: Keeping up with the Joneses with Optimal Contracts † Peter M. DeMarzo (Stanford University)

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Date: 2016-04-13 15:25:25 Asymmetric information Market failure Organizational theory Principalagent problem Economy Market economics) Economic equilibrium Economics		Relative Pay for Non-Relative Performance: Keeping up with the Joneses with Optimal Contracts † Peter M. DeMarzo (Stanford University) Add to Reading List Source URL: www.istfin.eco.usi.ch Download Document from Source Website File Size: 436,90 KB Share Document on Facebook

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