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Auction theory / Game theory / Mechanism design / Mathematics / Auctions / Marketing / Vickrey auction / Vector-valued function / Auction / Revenue equivalence / Envelope theorem
Date: 2014-03-26 06:49:17
Auction theory
Game theory
Mechanism design
Mathematics
Auctions
Marketing
Vickrey auction
Vector-valued function
Auction
Revenue equivalence
Envelope theorem

Journal of Economic Theory 85, 258Article ID jeth, available online at http:www.idealibrary.com on Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities* Philippe Jehiel

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Source URL: www.econ2.uni-bonn.de

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