The Condorcet set: majority voting over interconnected propositions by Klaus Nehring, Marcus Pivato, Clemens Puppe

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Date: 2013-12-03 11:41:29 Paradoxes Mathematics Politics Social choice theory Voting paradox Condorcet criterion Marquis de Condorcet Majoritarianism Discursive dilemma Voting system criteria Voting Voting theory		The Condorcet set: majority voting over interconnected propositions by Klaus Nehring, Marcus Pivato, Clemens Puppe Add to Reading List Source URL: econpapers.wiwi.kit.edu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 1,58 MB Share Document on Facebook

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