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Game theory / Economics / Vickrey auction / Auction / First-price sealed-bid auction / Spectrum auction / Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction / Walrasian auction / Price / Auction theory / Auctioneering / Business


An Efficient Dynamic Auction for Heterogeneous Commodities Lawrence M. Ausubel* 8 September[removed]first draft: 5 July 2000)
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Document Date: 2012-09-06 19:36:39

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File Size: 191,64 KB

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Company

Mobil / /

Country

United Kingdom / /

Currency

pence / USD / /

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Facility

Economics University of Maryland Tydings Hall / College Park / /

IndustryTerm

gas industry / communications spectrum / auction algorithm / paired and unpaired telecommunications spectrum / primal-dual algorithm / telecommunications spectrum / gas pipeline system / /

Organization

Bureau of the Public Debt / Econometric Society / World Congress / Professor Lawrence M. Ausubel Department / Economics University of Maryland Tydings Hall / U.S. Treasury / Department of the Treasury / /

Person

Lawrence M. Ausubel / Peter Cramton / Kathleen Jacobson / Ken Binmore / Daniel Vincent / /

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Position

auctioneer / fictitious Walrasian auctioneer / /

Technology

auction algorithm / cellular telephone / primal-dual algorithm / 5 auction algorithm / /

URL

http /

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