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Biology / Science / Evolutionary biologists / Fellows of the Royal Society / Selection / Evolutionarily stable strategy / Evolution and the Theory of Games / War of attrition / Sex ratio / Game theory / Evolutionary biology / Evolutionary game theory
Date: 2011-08-28 15:33:51
Biology
Science
Evolutionary biologists
Fellows of the Royal Society
Selection
Evolutionarily stable strategy
Evolution and the Theory of Games
War of attrition
Sex ratio
Game theory
Evolutionary biology
Evolutionary game theory

Sigma Xi, The Scientific Research Society Evolution and the Theory of Games: In situations characterized by conflict of interest, the best strategy to adopt depends on what others are doing Author(s): J. Maynard Smith S

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