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Economics / Evolutionarily stable strategy / War of attrition / Best response / Symmetric game / Nash equilibrium / Normal-form game / Outcome / Strategy / Game theory / Problem solving / Evolutionary game theory
Date: 2003-03-09 17:27:31
Economics
Evolutionarily stable strategy
War of attrition
Best response
Symmetric game
Nash equilibrium
Normal-form game
Outcome
Strategy
Game theory
Problem solving
Evolutionary game theory

Signal design features • Signal range: context and sender/receiver distance

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