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Auctioneering / Auction theory / National Road / Wheeling metropolitan area / First-price sealed-bid auction / West Virginia Route 2 / West Virginia / Wheeling /  West Virginia / Geography of the United States
Date: 2012-09-05 17:04:33
Auctioneering
Auction theory
National Road
Wheeling metropolitan area
First-price sealed-bid auction
West Virginia Route 2
West Virginia
Wheeling
West Virginia
Geography of the United States

City of Wheeling Council Chambers # 08508 September 10, 2012

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