<--- Back to Details
First PageDocument Content
Mathematics / Measure theory / Boolean algebra / Experiment / Sigma-algebra / Determinacy / Abstract algebra / Stochastic game / -automaton / Lie algebras / Lifting theory / Littelmann path model
Date: 2012-10-17 07:22:55
Mathematics
Measure theory
Boolean algebra
Experiment
Sigma-algebra
Determinacy
Abstract algebra
Stochastic game
-automaton
Lie algebras
Lifting theory
Littelmann path model

Playing Stochastic Games Precisely Taolue Chen1 , Vojtˇech Forejt1 , Marta Kwiatkowska1 , Aistis Simaitis1 , Ashutosh Trivedi2 , and Michael Ummels3 1 Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

Add to Reading List

Source URL: www.prismmodelchecker.org

Download Document from Source Website

File Size: 422,79 KB

Share Document on Facebook

Similar Documents

Parameter Synthesis for Probabilistic Timed Automata Using Stochastic Game Abstractions Aleksandra Jovanovi´c, Marta Kwiatkowska Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK  Abstract

Parameter Synthesis for Probabilistic Timed Automata Using Stochastic Game Abstractions Aleksandra Jovanovi´c, Marta Kwiatkowska Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK Abstract

DocID: 1xVzo - View Document

Sample Path Large Deviations for Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics∗ William H. Sandholm† and Mathias Staudigl‡ May 15, 2016  Abstract

Sample Path Large Deviations for Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics∗ William H. Sandholm† and Mathias Staudigl‡ May 15, 2016 Abstract

DocID: 1sB53 - View Document

Decision, Risk & Operations Working Papers Series A Mean-Risk Model for the Stochastic Traffic Assignment Problem E. Nikolova and N.E. Stier-Moses

Decision, Risk & Operations Working Papers Series A Mean-Risk Model for the Stochastic Traffic Assignment Problem E. Nikolova and N.E. Stier-Moses

DocID: 1reDb - View Document

E¢ cient Sequential Assignment with Incomplete Information Alex Gershkov and Benny MoldovanuAbstract

E¢ cient Sequential Assignment with Incomplete Information Alex Gershkov and Benny MoldovanuAbstract

DocID: 1r7IS - View Document

Optimal Voting Schemes with Costly Information Acquisition∗ Alex Gershkov† Department of Economics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Optimal Voting Schemes with Costly Information Acquisition∗ Alex Gershkov† Department of Economics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem

DocID: 1r4ru - View Document