Optimal Voting Schemes with Costly Information Acquisition∗ Alex Gershkov† Department of Economics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem

First Page		Document Content
Date: 2014-02-02 05:15:05 Social choice theory Political philosophy Politics Public choice theory Game theory Decision theory Psephology Voting system Electronic voting Stochastic programming Mechanism design Independent voter		Optimal Voting Schemes with Costly Information Acquisition∗ Alex Gershkov† Department of Economics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Add to Reading List Source URL: pluto.huji.ac.il Download Document from Source Website File Size: 439,62 KB Share Document on Facebook

	Analysis of an Electronic Voting Protocol in the Applied Pi Calculus Steve Kremer1 and Mark Ryan2 1 Laboratoire Sp´ecification et V´erification DocID: 1vquv - View Document
	Automated Verification of Remote Electronic Voting Protocols in the Applied Pi-calculus Michael Backes1,2 , C˘at˘alin Hri¸tcu1 , and Matteo Maffei1 1 Saarland University, Saarbrücken, Germany DocID: 1vpxM - View Document
	Mix-Nets Lecture 21 Some tools for electronic-voting (and other things) Mix-Nets DocID: 1uXVu - View Document
	Verifying Properties of Electronic Voting Protocols ∗ St´ephanie Delaune LSV, France T´el´ecom R&D ENS Cachan, CNRS, France DocID: 1uGhm - View Document
	Type-Based Verification of Electronic Voting Protocols Véronique Cortier1 , Fabienne Eigner2 , Steve Kremer1 , Matteo Maffei2 , and Cyrille Wiedling3 1 LORIA, CNRS & INRIA & University of Lorraine, France DocID: 1uE9A - View Document