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Asymmetric information / Market failure / Principalagent problem / Motivation / Moral hazard / Adverse selection / Insurance / Risk
Date: 2016-02-21 09:37:45
Asymmetric information
Market failure
Principalagent problem
Motivation
Moral hazard
Adverse selection
Insurance
Risk

Principal-agent dynamics David Zetland Global Challenges: Prosperity LUC ∼ 15 Feb 2016

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