181![THE PARADOX OF VOTER PARTICIPATION? A LABORATORY STUDY DAVID K. LEVINE, UCLA THOMAS R. PALFREY, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY A BSTRACT. It is widely believed that rational choice theory is grossly inconsistent with empirical obs THE PARADOX OF VOTER PARTICIPATION? A LABORATORY STUDY DAVID K. LEVINE, UCLA THOMAS R. PALFREY, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY A BSTRACT. It is widely believed that rational choice theory is grossly inconsistent with empirical obs](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/13c3bad4b9713f7fc7bb851682eb5aa7.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.eduLanguage: English - Date: 2005-09-13 19:12:22
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182![MEASURING PLAYERS’ LOSSES IN EXPERIMENTAL GAMES* Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine October 7, 1996 MEASURING PLAYERS’ LOSSES IN EXPERIMENTAL GAMES* Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine October 7, 1996](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/f6b11610afb8612ee946765ff76887e0.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.eduLanguage: English - Date: 1996-12-07 20:22:50
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183![The Slippery Slope of Concession1 Jack Hirshleifer, Michele Boldrin, and David K. Levine2 First version: January 30, 2000 This version: February 26, 2008 Abstract: We show that with common knowledge and a common rate of The Slippery Slope of Concession1 Jack Hirshleifer, Michele Boldrin, and David K. Levine2 First version: January 30, 2000 This version: February 26, 2008 Abstract: We show that with common knowledge and a common rate of](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/4694868c8382bb14a29ff3bf2cffba61.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.eduLanguage: English - Date: 2008-02-26 10:11:57
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184![A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control1 Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine2 First Version: August 5, 2004 This Version: September 14, 2005 A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control1 Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine2 First Version: August 5, 2004 This Version: September 14, 2005](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/4e16601f92c28494f6b8ba4995efeee8.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.eduLanguage: English - Date: 2005-09-14 23:03:24
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185![Quantum Games Have No News for Economists1 By David K. Levine2 This version: September 1, 2005 First version: December 3, 2005 Quantum computing offers the possibility of massively parallel computing that scales to large Quantum Games Have No News for Economists1 By David K. Levine2 This version: September 1, 2005 First version: December 3, 2005 Quantum computing offers the possibility of massively parallel computing that scales to large](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/439679b3753c326a4f53a11b4e762fe2.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.eduLanguage: English - Date: 2006-03-01 14:17:13
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186![When is Reputation Bad?1 Jeffrey Ely Drew Fudenberg David K. Levine2 First Version: April 22, 2002 This Version: November 20, 2005 When is Reputation Bad?1 Jeffrey Ely Drew Fudenberg David K. Levine2 First Version: April 22, 2002 This Version: November 20, 2005](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/36b393b24487d3889aa6c69c7cd0d0b2.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.eduLanguage: English - Date: 2005-11-21 14:01:27
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187![Inferior Products and Profitable Deception∗ Paul Heidhues ESMT, CEPR and CESifo Botond K˝oszegi Central European University, UC Berkeley, and CESifo Inferior Products and Profitable Deception∗ Paul Heidhues ESMT, CEPR and CESifo Botond K˝oszegi Central European University, UC Berkeley, and CESifo](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/117e78b43039774970e3cbcf1a36df94.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: federation.ens.frLanguage: English - Date: 2013-01-16 08:57:54
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188![The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games1 Drew Fudenberg David K. Levine2 The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games1 Drew Fudenberg David K. Levine2](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/b43d3ed0382e04c3d34e286357c21d0e.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.eduLanguage: English - Date: 2004-06-17 14:23:12
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189![Reputation and Distribution in a Gift Giving Game1 David K. Levine2 March 18, 1995 © This document is copyrighted by the author. You may freely reproduce and distribute it electronically or in print, provided it is dist Reputation and Distribution in a Gift Giving Game1 David K. Levine2 March 18, 1995 © This document is copyrighted by the author. You may freely reproduce and distribute it electronically or in print, provided it is dist](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/ebc2f93c47488c0283122c079100aa3f.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.eduLanguage: English - Date: 1996-12-07 20:20:24
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190![PERFECT PUBLIC EQUILIBRIUM WHEN PLAYERS ARE PATIENT DREW FUDENBERG, DAVID K. LEVINE AND SATORU TAKAHASHI A BSTRACT. The limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs of a repeated game as the discount factor goes to on PERFECT PUBLIC EQUILIBRIUM WHEN PLAYERS ARE PATIENT DREW FUDENBERG, DAVID K. LEVINE AND SATORU TAKAHASHI A BSTRACT. The limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs of a repeated game as the discount factor goes to on](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/87721b2b4bedb6738a4a25d8f43fed1b.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.eduLanguage: English - Date: 2005-09-12 23:46:36
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