k-game

Results: 460



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181THE PARADOX OF VOTER PARTICIPATION? A LABORATORY STUDY DAVID K. LEVINE, UCLA THOMAS R. PALFREY, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY A BSTRACT. It is widely believed that rational choice theory is grossly inconsistent with empirical obs

THE PARADOX OF VOTER PARTICIPATION? A LABORATORY STUDY DAVID K. LEVINE, UCLA THOMAS R. PALFREY, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY A BSTRACT. It is widely believed that rational choice theory is grossly inconsistent with empirical obs

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Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu

Language: English - Date: 2005-09-13 19:12:22
182MEASURING PLAYERS’ LOSSES IN EXPERIMENTAL GAMES* Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine October 7, 1996

MEASURING PLAYERS’ LOSSES IN EXPERIMENTAL GAMES* Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine October 7, 1996

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Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu

Language: English - Date: 1996-12-07 20:22:50
183The Slippery Slope of Concession1 Jack Hirshleifer, Michele Boldrin, and David K. Levine2 First version: January 30, 2000 This version: February 26, 2008 Abstract: We show that with common knowledge and a common rate of

The Slippery Slope of Concession1 Jack Hirshleifer, Michele Boldrin, and David K. Levine2 First version: January 30, 2000 This version: February 26, 2008 Abstract: We show that with common knowledge and a common rate of

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Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu

Language: English - Date: 2008-02-26 10:11:57
184A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control1  Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine2 First Version: August 5, 2004 This Version: September 14, 2005

A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control1 Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine2 First Version: August 5, 2004 This Version: September 14, 2005

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Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu

Language: English - Date: 2005-09-14 23:03:24
185Quantum Games Have No News for Economists1 By David K. Levine2 This version: September 1, 2005 First version: December 3, 2005 Quantum computing offers the possibility of massively parallel computing that scales to large

Quantum Games Have No News for Economists1 By David K. Levine2 This version: September 1, 2005 First version: December 3, 2005 Quantum computing offers the possibility of massively parallel computing that scales to large

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Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu

Language: English - Date: 2006-03-01 14:17:13
186When is Reputation Bad?1 Jeffrey Ely Drew Fudenberg David K. Levine2 First Version: April 22, 2002 This Version: November 20, 2005

When is Reputation Bad?1 Jeffrey Ely Drew Fudenberg David K. Levine2 First Version: April 22, 2002 This Version: November 20, 2005

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Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu

Language: English - Date: 2005-11-21 14:01:27
187Inferior Products and Profitable Deception∗ Paul Heidhues ESMT, CEPR and CESifo Botond K˝oszegi Central European University, UC Berkeley, and CESifo

Inferior Products and Profitable Deception∗ Paul Heidhues ESMT, CEPR and CESifo Botond K˝oszegi Central European University, UC Berkeley, and CESifo

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Source URL: federation.ens.fr

Language: English - Date: 2013-01-16 08:57:54
188The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games1 Drew Fudenberg David K. Levine2

The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games1 Drew Fudenberg David K. Levine2

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Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu

Language: English - Date: 2004-06-17 14:23:12
189Reputation and Distribution in a Gift Giving Game1 David K. Levine2 March 18, 1995 © This document is copyrighted by the author. You may freely reproduce and distribute it electronically or in print, provided it is dist

Reputation and Distribution in a Gift Giving Game1 David K. Levine2 March 18, 1995 © This document is copyrighted by the author. You may freely reproduce and distribute it electronically or in print, provided it is dist

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Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu

Language: English - Date: 1996-12-07 20:20:24
190PERFECT PUBLIC EQUILIBRIUM WHEN PLAYERS ARE PATIENT DREW FUDENBERG, DAVID K. LEVINE AND SATORU TAKAHASHI A BSTRACT. The limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs of a repeated game as the discount factor goes to on

PERFECT PUBLIC EQUILIBRIUM WHEN PLAYERS ARE PATIENT DREW FUDENBERG, DAVID K. LEVINE AND SATORU TAKAHASHI A BSTRACT. The limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs of a repeated game as the discount factor goes to on

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Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu

Language: English - Date: 2005-09-12 23:46:36